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Santha Rasaiah and David Newell

directive, proposing individual licensing and general authorization
illustrates some of them. How is an electronic newspaper to be classi
fied? As another form of the printed press or as a subject of telecom
licensing? The answer might determine the extent to which its content
can be regulated or the entity made available or who can issue it. It
could also determine who makes those regulations. In Germany, for
example, it will determine whether regional or federal government
decides on the appropriate controls.
The Commission’s updated Action Plan^° suggests that there will be
many opportunities for these issue to be raised—the green paper on
new audio visual services, the green paper on commercial communica
tions, the Media Concentration Directive, directives on telecommuni
cations, ISDN, and privacy issues, and the various communications on
industrial and regulatory aspects of the new service industries, on
industry, the citizen, and the information society. 1996 may show
whether debate within the Information Society Forum will yield con
sensus or merely inject further contradictory opinions into the debate.
® Available from the Information Society Project Office, European Commission, BU 24-2/
78, 200 Rue de la loi, B-1049 BRUSSELS.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
US Media Ownership
MONROE PRICE* AND JONATHAN WEINBERGt

I
For the first fifty years of the history of broadcasting in the United
States, two models, not one, governed ownership and regulation in the
electronic media. US regulators oversaw a monopoly in telecommuni
cations (though not a State monopoly, as in European Countries). By
contrast, US law provided for competition in broadcasting. While
AT&T, the monopoly telephone carrier, controlled nearly all tel
ephone traffic, US regulators established a system of competing pri
vate broadcast stations.
Technology weakened this system’s underlying categories. The en
try of cable television caused the traditional model of competition
among local broadcast stations to lose much of its meaning. Increas
ingly, video programming came to be distributed through naturalmonopoly cable systems, rather than through local broadcast stations.
At the same time, the monopoly model for telephony came under
technological and legal attack. The federal courts in the 1970s opened
the door for competition in long-distance services;' the possibility of
competition in the local loop came not long after.
By the late 1980s, regulators contemplated the possibilities that
telephone companies could compete with cable and that cable could
compete in providing local exchange services. The cable industry
began to relax its opposition to telephone company entry into cable,
as cable saw a powerful business opportunity for itself in the markets
formerly reserved for telephone companies. Industry negotiators
began exploring the possibility of legislation to lift the prohibitions
keeping each industry out of the other’s territory. The federal courts
began to question the constitutionality of rules forbidding tele
phone companies from providing video programming, or owning cable
* Professor of Law, Yeshiva University,
t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University.
' See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F2d 590 (DC Cir.), cert, denied, 439 US 980
(1978); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F2d 365 (DC Cir. 1977), cert, denied 434
US 1040 (1978).
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television systems, in their telephone service areas.^ It became clear
that the prohibitions segregating cable television from telephone
service would not survive.
In this essay, we examine traditional US thinking concerning mass
media ownership. We then review recent developments, including the
just-enacted Telecommunications Act of 1996. Changes in ownership
regulation reveal changing understandings of the goals of media
policy. Under traditional US policy, telephone companies and cable
companies were kept at arm’s length from each other; the law re
quired television stations and cable systems in common viewing areas
to be separately owned; and there were carefully calibrated limita
tions on the number of radio or television stations any one entity
could hold. Almost all of that has now been swept away.

II
Traditional US thinking regarding mass media ownership and control
has rested on two assumptions. The first is descriptive: it predicts that
a speaker’s identity will strongly influence the content of his speech.
The second is normative: it prescribes that the owner of the physical
communications resources—printing press, broadcast station, or
whatever—used to disseminate speech should control that speech.
The first assumption posits a link between the identity of a speaker
and the content of its speech. Speakers, the theory runs, tell stories
reflecting their own backgrounds, identities, and views.^ Government
policies affecting the identity of speakers will affect the content of
those stories.
The second assumption derives from the central role of private
autonomy, and property rights, in US constitutional thinking. A
foundational theme of US free-speech philosophy has been that gov
ernment’s role in the market-place of ideas is presumptively limited to
the enforcement of property rights in communications resources, and
other common law support for private ordering. A crucial role of free
speech, the theory runs, is to serve as a check on overreaching govern
ment;'* free speech is best protected front government interference
and is best able to fulfill that role when the private owner of commu
nications resources controls their use.^ Consistently with that vision.
^ The leading decision is Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F3d 181 (4th
Cir. 1994), vacated for consideration of mootness, 116 SCt 1036 (1996).
^ See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 US 547, 569-83 (1990); Wendy M. Rogovin, ‘The
Regulation of Television in the Public Interest; On Creating a Parallel Universe in Which
Minorities Speak and Are Heard’, 42 Catholic LRev. 51, 54-68 (1992).
See Vincent Blasi, ‘The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory’ [1977] Am. B Found.
Res. J 521.
5 Thus A. J. Liebling’s quip: freedom of the press is guaranteed to all those who own one;
A. J. Liebling, The Press (1975), 32.
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the drafters of the 1934 Communications Act took pains to specify
that a broadcast licensee ‘shall not... be deemed a common carrier’,
required by law to carry programming provided by others.'’ Indeed,
the FCC for many years deemed it an abdication of a broadcaster’s
public-interest duty for it to relinquish legal control over the program
ming it broadcast.’
Beginning in the 1940s, US policymakers built up a set of ragged,
not always articulated, understandings flowing from these two as
sumptions. Different media owners would provide different media
voices. More owners would mean more voices. A range of owners
would lead to a range of views. A multiplicity of owners would lead to
competition; competition would lead to robust, open discussion. Ac
cess by speakers would be more nearly equal, in part because media
outlets would be sympathetic to a wider variety of views.
The Federal Communications Commission drew on this vision in
developing its concentration policies; it sought to achieve ‘diversifica
tion of program and service viewpoints’, and thus the preconditions
for democratic discourse, by encouraging diversity in ownership.**
Rather than seeking to regulate speech content directly, it promul
gated rules establishing what might be called an ‘ownership access’
policy.
The Commission began in 1938 by adopting a strong presumption
against allowing two or more AM radio stations under common own
ership in a single community.’’ Within a short time, the Commission
had rules in place barring the ownership in a single market of more
than one station in any given broadcast service—AM, FM, or televi
sion. Until 1970, though, FCC rules still allowed a person to own an
AM, an FM, and a television station in the same community. The FCC
partially plugged that gap in 1970 and 1971, banning the acquisition by
a single entity, in a single market, of both a radio and a VHF television
station.The agency explained:
A proper objective is the maximum diversity of ownership that technology
permits in each area. We are of the view that 60 different licensees are more
47 use § 153(h). The Communications Act itself provides some exceptions to this rule; the
most important is 47 USC § 312(a)(7), requiring broadcasters to sell reasonable amounts of time
to candidates for federal elective office for political advertising: see Columbia Broadcasting
System v. FCC, 453 US 367 (1981).
The Sup. Ct. relied on s. 153(h) when, in 1979, it struck down FCC rules requiring cable
systems to offer channels for public, educational, and governmental use. Those rules, the Court
explained, impermissibly imposed common-carrier obligations; FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.,
440 US 689 (1979). Congress later revisited that issue in the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984; see text accompanying n. 35 below.
’ See, e.g.. Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 581 F2d 917 (DC Cir. 1978); Filing of
Agreements Involving the Sale of Broadcast Time for Resale, 33 FCC2d 654 (1972). The Commis
sion largely abandoned that position in Part-Time Programming, 82 FCC2d 107 (1980).
* Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership, 18 FCC 288, 292-3 (1953).
’ Genessee Radio Corp., 5 FCC 183 (1938).
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and TV Broadcast Stations, 28 FCC2d 662 (1971)
(reconsidering Multiple Ownership, 22 FCC2d 306 (1970)).
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desirable than 50, and even that 51 are more desirable than 50. In a rapidly
changing social climate, communication of ideas is vital. If a city has 60
frequencies available but they are licensed to only 50 different licensees, the
number of sources for ideas is not maximized. It might be the 51st licensee
that would become the communication channel for a solution to a severe
social crisis."

The FCC relaxed its ‘one-to-a-market’ rules in 1989, and again in
1992. After 1992, licensees were allowed to own up to three or four
radio stations in a given market,'^ and the Commission was indulgent
towards requests for waiver, in large markets, of the bar on radioVHF combinations.'^
The FCC began in 1940 to limit the number of broadcast outlets that
could be owned by a single entity in different geographical markets.
Under rules promulgated in 1953 and 1954, no entity could own more
than seven AM, seven FM, and seven television stations (of which no
more than five could be VHF) nationwide.''' This approach, the
Commission explained, would promote ‘diversification of program
services’ without ‘governmental encroachment on ... the prime re
sponsibility of the broadcast licensee’."’ The Commission later relaxed
these rules, too, in 1984 and again in 1992. After 1992, one was allowed
to own twenty AM and twenty FM radio stations nationwide.'" One
could own up to twelve television stations, provided that their aggre
gate reach was no more than 25 per cent of the national audience.'''
The most elaborate FCC articulation of the relationship of owner
ship to public discourse came in the context of newspaper-broadcast
cross-ownership. The agency first addressed this question in 1970. In
almost 100 cities, newspapers and television stations were under com
mon control. In a few communities, the daily newspaper was under
common ownership with the only radio or television station. The FCC
determined that this concentration of ownership was inconsistent with
its assumptions about democratic discourse. It banned the formation
" Multiple Ownership, n. 10 above, 311.
Radio Multiple Ownership Rules, 1 FCCRcd. 6387 (1992), on reconsideration, 9 FCCRcd.
7183 (1994).
See Second Report and Order, 4 FCCRcd. 1741,
reconsideration, 4 FCCRcd. 6489 (1989).
Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership, 18 FCC 288 (1953), 43 FCC 2797
(1954). The Sup. Ct. upheld the rules in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 US 192
(1956).
'' Multiple Ownership, n, 14 above, 293.
Radio Multiple Ownership Rules, n. 12 above. A minority owner could hold up to five
additional stations in each service; a non-minority holder could hold non-controlling interests in
up to five additional minority or small-business controlled stations.
Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 100 FCC2d 17 (1984), on reconsideration, 100
FCC2d 74 (1985). UHF stations were counted at only one-half of their theoretical reach, because
of the physical limitations of their signals. Minority owners could hold up to 14 stations, and non
minority owners could acquire non-controlling interests in two additional minority-controlled
stations. Aggregate audience reach could be as high as 30%, provided that 5% of that reach was
contributed by minority-controlled stations.
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of new newspaper-broadcast combinations, and required divestiture
where the owner of the sole newspaper in a community was also the
owner of the sole television station, or of the sole radio station in
a community that had no television station.'" It was intolerable, said
the Commission, to allow such an entity an ‘effective monopoly’
in the local market-place of ideas. The Supreme Court affirmed; it
upheld as rational the Commission’s finding that ‘diversification of
ownership would enhance the possibility of achieving greater diversity
of viewpoints’.'®
Congress and the FCC imposed cross-ownership restrictions in
other areas. It was illegal for a person to control a television broadcast
station and a cable system in the same market.^" It was illegal for a
person to control a telephone company and a cable system in the same
area.^’
Much of US broadcast regulation since 1934 was based on, and
sought to reinforce, the link between ownership and content. That
connection was crucial if the Commission were to pursue a policy of
ownership access—if it were to bring about diversity of speech
through ownership regulation. The emergence of radio networks pro
vided one early threat to that link. The Commission initiated exten
sive inquiries in 1938 into the new ‘chain broadcasting’, reflecting its
concern that binding contractual relationships made national net
works the true owners of local stations rather than the local licensees.
Those contractual relationships threatened the Commission’s ideal of
discourse driven by independent, competitive local voices. The FCC
announced regulations intended to ensure the ‘independence’ of the
local outlets, emphasizing the local broadcaster’s ability to replace
network offerings with programming more idiosyncratically respon
sive to the community of licence.^^
Later on, the Commission sought to address the link between own
ership and content from a different perspective: it provided that it
would grant a preference, in comparative licensing hearings, to ownSecond Report and Order, 50 FCC2d 1046 (1974), on reconsideration, 53 FCC2d 589 (1975),
affd in part & rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Citizens Comm, for Broadcasting v. FCC 555 F2d 938
(DC Cir. 1977), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 436 US 775 (1978).
FCC V. Nat’l Citizens Comm, for Broadcasting, 436 US 775, 796 (1978).
» 47 use § 533(a).
Ibid. § 533(b). The constitutionality of that prohibition was hotly contested. See e.g.
Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated for
consideration of mootness, 116 SCt 2374 (1996). The FCC took the position that it could waive
this prohibition for telephone companies complying with its video dialtone rules. Telephone
Company—Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rule, 10 FCCRcd. 7887 (1995).
See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 US 190 (1943). In 1977, the Commission
repealed almost all of its rules governing the network-affiliate relationship in radio: Network
Broadcasting by Standard (AM) and FM Broadcast Stations, 63 FCC2d 674 (1977). Over the past
year, the Commission has proposed to repeal almost all of its rules regulating the networkaffiliate relationship in television. See, in particular. Programming Practices of Broadcast Televi
sion Networks and Affiliates, 1995 FCC LEXIS 3979 (15 June 1995).
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ers who promised that they would participate in station management
on a full-time basis.^^ An ownership access policy, after all, would
make rather less sense if owners did not involve themselves in station
management and programming decisions.^'*
Probably the clearest example of FCC reliance on assumptions
about the relationship of ownership to narrative, in attempting to
achieve the conditions for democratic discourse, was the agency’s
effort to encourage ownership of radio and television stations by
minority group members. The FCC gave minority group members
special, privileged opportunities to become owners, granting those
groups enhanced opportunities to compete in the arena that one of us
has called the ‘market for loyalties’.^^ The Commission gave an advan
tage in comparative hearings to minority would-be licensees, so long
as they promised to participate actively in station management; it gave
other licensees facing possible revocation or non-renewal an incentive
to transfer their licences to minority owners; and it established a tax
certificate programme granting favourable tax treatment to any
broadcaster selling its station to a minority owner
The Commission designed these programmes in order to influence
the mix of views and images presented by broadcasters,^'' and de
fended them in the Supreme Court on precisely that basis: expanded
minority ownership, the Commission argued, would produce more
diversity in broadcast speech. In 1990, a majority of the Supreme
Court agreed.^*^ The Court gave weight to FCC and congressional
statements finding a link between expanded minority ownership and
greater broadcast diversity.^^ It cited evidence that ‘an owner’s minor
ity status influences the selection of topics for news coverage and the
presentation of editorial viewpoint, especially on matters of particular
concern to minorities’, and that ‘a minority owner is more likely to
See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 FCC2d 393, 395-6 (1965).
Last year, the DC Circuit declared the FCC’s focus on owner participation in station
management to be arbitrary, and hence impermissible: Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F3d 875 (DC Cir.
1994).
“ See Monroe Price, ‘The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global Competi
tion for Allegiances’, 104 Yale LJ 667 (1994).
® See Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 FCC2d 979 (1978). On the tax
certificate programme, see Bruce R. Wilde, Note, ‘FCC Tax Certificates for Minority Ownership
of Broadcast Facilities: A Critical Re-Examination of Policy’, 138 U Pa. LRev. 979 (1990).
The Commission gave women a similar preference in comparative hearings, see Mid-Florida
Television Corp., 70 FCC2d 281, 326 (Rev. Bd. 1978), set aside on other grounds, 87 FCC2d 203
(1981), but it did not include women in the distress sale or tax certificate programmes. The DC
Circuit held the comparative preference for women unconstitutional in Lamprecht v. FCC, 958
F2d 382 (DC Cir. 1992).
See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 FCC2d 979
(1978).
“ Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 US 547 (1990); see Michel Rosenfeld, 'Metro Broad
casting, Inc. V. FCO. Affirmative Action at the Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equal
ity’, 38 UCLA LRev. 583 (1991).
® 497 US at 569.
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employ minorities in managerial and other important roles where
they can have an impact on station policies’.3" A 1995 Supreme Court
decision disfavouring any sort of racially-defined government prefer
ence, though, left the programme moribund;^' the Commission is now
reconsidering all of its licensing preferences.^^
The FCC’s ownership access policy had a mechanical truth to it. If
one is seeking to achieve diversity in speech, a system with more
owners seems better than one with fewer. The policy’s assumptions,
however, were incomplete. Its descriptive predicate—that a speaker’s
identity strongly determines the content of its speech—underesti
mated the flattening and homogenizing effect of the commercial
market-place. In broadcast television, where the numbers of speakers
in each local market have been few and each licensee has sought to
attract a lowest-common-denominator mass market, broadcast offer
ings have been largely homogenous notwithstanding the Commis
sion’s diversity efforts. For the most part, network affiliates have
simply adopted or ‘cleared’ network programming during prime time.
Even non-network offerings have tended to vary little, in significant
respect, from one speaker to the next. Broadcast television licensees,
no matter how diverse, tend to choose their programming with an eye
to maximizing audiences and advertising revenues.-*’ In radio, the
market is more fractionalized, but the likelihood is still small that any
speaker speaks with a genuinely distinctive voice.
Nor has the slight racial diversity in ownership achieved by the FCC
led to the kind of programme diversity with overtones important in
furthering pluralist goals. At the margin, stations owned by minority
groups are somewhat more sensitive to minority issues; perhaps they
have better affirmative action records. But there has not been a con
vincing showing that, where a broadcast owner is interested in maxi
mizing profit, the nature of the speech varies substantially with the
nature of the owner.
Cable brought a different perspective to the video market. In the
vast majority of US markets, the cable operator is a local monopolist.
While cable television has brought many more channels to each
household, each cable operator more or less controls its entire system,
choosing each of the programmers that the system will carry. On the
other hand, a profit-maximizing cable operator will likely seek to
carry diverse programme channels in order to increase subscribers.
» Ibid. 580-1.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 SCt. 2097 (1995).
” See Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 7 FCCRcd.
2664 (1992), 8 FCCRcd. 5475 (1993), 9 FCCRcd. 2821 (1994). Congress has acted independently
to end the tax certificate programme.
” See generally C. Edwin Baker, ‘Advertising and a Democratic Press’, 140 UPa. LRev.
2097 (1992); Jonathan Weinberg, ‘Broadcasting and Speech’, 81 Calif LRev. 1101, 1152-7
(1993).
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Cable operators have no day-to-day control over those programming
services once they make the initial choice to carry them. (The strategy
is reminiscent of the argument, long made in the context of European
broadcasting but ill-tolerated at the FCC, that a single manager of
frequencies will maximize audience by purposely and rationally diver
sifying, playing to small segments, in the way that only a monopolist
can do.) Cable’s programming structure thus achieves greater diver
sity in programme offerings at the cost of tearing a small hole in the
central assumption of US concentration rules, the link between own
ership of communications facilities and meaningful control over the
messages conveyed by speech using those facilities.
Perhaps recognizing that shift, federal cable television regulation
began to incorporate common-carrier aspects. The 1984 Cable
Communications Policy Act requires larger cable systems to make
leased-access channels available to unaffiliated programmers, without
regard to the content of the programming the outside programmers
provide.^'* The same Act authorizes local franchising authorities to
require cable operators to provide public access channels, and
channels reserved for educational or governmental use; the cable
operator is forbidden to exercise editorial control over those chan
nels.^'’ The Federal Communications Commission promulgated ‘video
dialtone’ rules allowing telephone companies to distribute video
programming only if they established common-carrier platforms
accommodating multiple outside programmers on a non-discriminatory basis.’’* Cable’s position in the video market paved the way for a
new approach to access and diversity issues, one with a role for com
mon carrier regulation. Even the most passionate critics of FCC regu
lation of broadcasting conceded the legal permissibility—if not
desirability—of common carrier regulation of the old and the new
media.-^^
47 use § 532. The efficacy of this provision is unclear; battles continue to rage over the
rates that programmers must pay for leased access. In 1992, Congress amended the statute to
allow cable operators to decline to carry leased-access programming ‘that the cable operator
reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently
offensive manner as measured by contemporary community standards’. Cable Television Con
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10(a), 106 Stat. 1460,
1486 (1992) (codified at 47 USC § 532(h)); see Denver Area Educ. Telecom. Consortium v. FCC,
116 set 2374 (1996).
47 USC § 531. Congress in 1992 directed the FCC to promulgate regulations enabling cable
operators to prohibit, on such channels, programming that contains ‘sexually explicit conduct, or
material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct’. Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (1992); see Denver
Area Educ. Telecom. Consortium, n. 34 above.
* See Telephone Company—Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules (Reconsideration and
Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), n. 21 above. These rules were superseded by
the open video system provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
” See Thomas G. Krattenmaker and L. A. Powe, Jr., ‘Converging First Amendment Princi
ples for Converging Communications Media’, 104 Yale LJ 1719,1737-9 (1995).
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III
Today, the old approach to ownership regulation lies in ruins. It is no
longer possible to think about regulation in terms of separated catego
ries—broadcasting and telecommunications—for the transmission of
information. In the new global economy, many US legislators see
more need to support huge media entities that can compete interna
tionally and contribute to a more favourable balance of payments
than to ensure that minorities within the borders of the United States
have their say. In the eyes of many, the new abundance of channels of
communication means that government need no longer seek to ensure
diverse and competing speakers.
The FCC, at the start of 1995, spurred by huge increases in the
number of broadcast outlets, proposed to dismantle much of its re
maining ownership regulation. It solicited comment on whether it
should relax its rule forbidding ownership of two television stations in
a single market, whether it should relax or even eliminate its bar on
radio-TV combinations in a single market, and whether it should
eliminate its numerical station limit on ownership of television sta
tions in different markets, perhaps raising the aggregate audience
reach cap as high as 50 per cent.^*’
The FCC’s proposals were overtaken by Congressional action. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 drastically overhauls broadcast
ownership rules. It eliminates any national limitation on radio or
television station ownership, beyond a solitary ban on control of
television stations that, in the aggregate, reach more than 35 per cent
of the nation’s population. It sharply loosens local radio ownership
rules, allowing a single entity to own five to eight commercial radio
stations in a given market. It further relaxes the limits on radio-TV
combinations. It eliminates the cable-broadcast cross-ownership ban.
It invites more deregulation at the hands of the FCC.
What philosophy and structure does the new law supply, as it
sweeps the old rules away? The law’s goals are sweeping: it contem
plates a world in which all Americans have access to ‘high-speed,
switched, broadband telecommunications capability’ enabling users
to ‘originate and receive high-quality . . . graphics and video telecom
munications’. Its drafters hope to achieve that end through a heavy
dose of competition—the product of radical deregulation—and a hint
of new common carrier thinking.
The Act starts by imposing a duty on local telephone companies to
provide full interconnection, and non-discriminatory access, to other
entities seeking to provide local telecommunications services. By re^ Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 10 FCCRcd.
3524, 3568, 3575-8, 3580-1 (1995).
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quiring interconnection, the drafters plan to subject local tele
phone companies to competition from cable companies and new
local telecommunications providers. The Act pre-empts localgovernment barriers to cable companies’ provision of telecommunica
tions services.
In return for interconnection, the Act grants the telephone compa
nies a variety of boons. First, with FCC permission, they can provide
long-distance service. Indeed, the FCC may approve a telephone
company’s entry into the long-distance market, carrying calls originat
ing in its local service area, even if the company is not in fact subject
to competition in its local service area. It is enough that the company
has filed, and the FCC and State authorities have approved, a state
ment of the terms pursuant to which it would offer interconnection if
it received a bona fide request.
The statute promises telephone companies flexibility in FCC rate
regulation, directing the agency to eliminate such regulation where it
is not necessary to ensure just and non-discriminatory rates. It in
cludes only weak provisions designed to ensure continuation of serv
ice to poor and rural users. It authorizes telephone companies to offer
‘electronic publishing’ and other information services.
Most important for purposes of this essay, the Act authorizes tel
ephone companies to provide video programming. Telephone compa
nies have the option of acting as traditional cable operators, subject
to local franchising requirements and other regulation.^® The law,
though, gives telephone companies a more attractive option: they are
freed from local franchising and regulation if they choose to offer
programming over ‘open video systems’.^^® The operator of such a
system may not (once demand for carriage exceeds its channel capac
ity) select the programming on more than one-third of its channels,
and may not discriminate among video providers with regard to car
riage.'" It may not unreasonably discriminate in its own favour with
regard to information provided to subscribers for purposes of select
ing programming, although it may negotiate disparate contracts with
unaffiliated providers ‘to allow consumer access to their signals on any
level or screen of any gateway, menu or program guide’. It is subject
to rules, to be prescribed by the FCC, ensuring that it offers public
access, and carries the signals of local broadcast stations, on terms
similar to those governing conventional cable systems.
The Act appears to subject open video systems to no rate regulation
at all. It removes almost all rate regulation of conventional cable
television service by 31 March 1999.
” Under most circumstances, however, a local telephone company can buy no more than 10%
of an existing cable company in its service area.
* The operators of such systems, however, can be required to pay fees to local governments
in lieu of cable franchise fees.
The statute leaves it to the FCC to devise the process by which the system’s remaining
channels are to be programmed.
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IV
This legislation reflects a marked shift in philosophy. The old rules
were based on the assumption that diversity of ownership, both in
terms of the number of owners and the kinds of owners, would mean
diversity of views. They presupposed a government role in ensuring
a large and diverse set of speakers. The new rules experiment with a
breakdown of the link between content and conduit; they suggest
a role for some sort of common carrier regulation. They otherwise
seek to replace regulation with competition as the engine of
diversity.
A variety of different changes have come together here. In part, the
shift in federal law derives from changes in ideology. Over the last
twenty years, a fervour for the workings of the market has overtaken
a commitment to federal intervention. Aside from regulation of sexu
ally explicit speech (where intrusive regulation is increasingly in
vogue), policymakers now impose a far heavier burden of proof on
those who would justify regulatory controls. The FCC has so favoured
deregulation that none of the traditional restrictions, including those
on cross-ownership, have seemed secure. The idea that there should
be special efforts to encourage minority voices in the media now is
relegated to the dustbin of history. Worries that no media company
should be too large have given way to ideas that bigness is valuable.
Scholars who long argued that vertical integration, e.g. between cable
operators and video programme services was not as important as
horizontal integration have prevailed, and even horizontal integration
is no longer out of the question.
This deregulatory fervour has been matched by a shift in First
Amendment thinking, emphasizing limits on government’s ability to
prescribe market barriers and market structure. By the mid-1990s, it
was common for judges to hold that the First Amendment right to
speak protected not only individuals and newspapers, not only broad
casters, but also cable systems and telephone companies. Laws that
precluded telephone companies from providing video service sud
denly were cast into constitutional doubt.
Ideology and constitutional law aside, an obvious source of regula
tory change was change in technology. Technological changes brought
about the so-called ‘end of scarcity’: the creation of seeming abun
dance in channels of distribution. Beyond that, they made regulatory
market segmentation increasingly artificial and increasingly ineffi
cient. Vertical integration of distribution services and programming
services proceeded rapidly in the 1980s. Broadcast and cable proper
ties came under common ownership (though, by law, not in the same
market). Because of these new styles of building businesses, federally
enforced cartelization—separating telephony, cable, broadcast, and
newspapers—no longer enjoyed private support. The large players
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wanted to acquire or be acquired; they saw federal restrictions as
obsolete.
The technological changes also mean that the United States cannot
make policy for the electronic media in isolation from the rest of the
world. We have seen global shifts in the structure of telecommunica
tions carriers and video providers. Dissolving federal regulation is
now seen as a method of increasing the power of one of America’s
major contributors to a favourable balance of payments. Entertain
ment is so important an export, in terms of economics and interna
tional politics, that the Congress and the government are inordinately
inclined to help the industry position itself to dominate the world
market. More generally, the increasingly global nature of the commu
nications market-place is forcing a global harmonization of communi
cations rules. It would be impossible, over time, to maintain an
equilibrium in which companies with global pretensions have mark
edly different structures in America and throughout the world.

Section 4(2) Postponement Orders: Media
Reports of Court Proceedings under the
Contempt of Court Act 1981
IAN CRAM*

1. Introduction
The scope of the present article is to review the operation of section
4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 which allows a court to order
the postponement of media reports of court proceedings. Undoubt
edly a less draconian measure than others which prohibit publication
at any point in the future,' it should however be remembered that, in
a context in which the instantaneous transmission of information is
highly prized, news postponed often ceases to be news at all, hence the
seriousness with which the media regard such restrictions. It is not
intended in the present discussion to provide a survey of other statu
tory and common law controls over media reports of open court
proceedings which today heavily qualify the principle of open justice
enunciated by the House of Lords in Scott v. Scott [1913] AC 417.^
Instead, attention will be focused upon judicial regulation of the con
flict between free speech interests and those of fair trial and the
proper administration of justice when it is alleged that unfettered
reporting of on-going court proceedings will cause prejudice to those
proceedings or others which are pending or imminent.
This chapter begins by analysing the common law prior to the
1981 Act. The form and subsequent interpretation of section 4(2)
are then examined. Attention is later given to some important
procedural issues which emerged once the power of postponement
began to be used. One of my main contentions in respect of develop
ments in England and Wales will be that, while some evidence exists
* Leeds University.
' See e.g. the Contempt of Court Act 1981, s. 11. At the time of writing, it is reported that the
Home Secretary is proposing to prohibit the reporting of ‘false’ or ‘irrelevant’ allegations made
by barristers during speeches of mitigation after a defendant has been found guilty: The Times,
18 Nov. 1995.
^ For a commentary on reporting restrictions generally, see A. Nicol and H. Rogers in The
Yearbook of Media and Entertainment Law 1995 (e.g. M. Barendt, S. Bate, J. Dickens, and J.
Michael (eds.)) (Clarendon, Oxford, 1995) 295-310. Also G. Robertson and A. Nicol, Media
Law (3rd edn.. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1992), ch. 7. On s. 4(2) see M, Beloff, ‘Fair Trial—
Free Press? Reporting Restrictions in Law and Practice’ [1992] PL 92.

